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Nowak A., Milczarek D. 
EASTERN DIMENSION OF THE ENP – A NEW CHALLENGE FOR THE EUROPEAN 
UNION. THE CASE OF UKRAINE 
 
В своей статье авторы исследуют сущность понятия Европейская политика соседства (ЕПС), как  
инструмента развития государства в и вне объединения "Европейский Союз". ЕПС рассмотрен как "на-
стоящий парадокс", являющийся переходным, но не обязательным фактором для полноправной ассоциации 
в ЕС. Приведены примеры стран ЦВЕ на пути к европейской интеграции, в частности, Польши, и очерчены 
перспективы в рамках ЕПС для Украины. 
Ключевые слова: Европейская политика соседства, Восточная политика, страны-члены ЕС,  
институциональные трансформации. 
 
The European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP), in development for several years now, should be seen as one of 
complex and innovative efforts undertaken so far in the history of the European Communities’ external relations. 
This, quite naturally, exposes it to a great deal of controversy, manifested, among other things, in a vast diversity of 
opinions thereupon. Indeed, the ENP has been evaluated in most different ways, from very critical in which it is 
seen as an ineffective project meaning hardly more than a means of propaganda, to statements going as far as  
saying this is the EU’s only foreign policy that really works properly.  
Leaving this controversy aside, it should be pointed out that the European Neighbourhood Policy has featured, 
as the European Union’s field of activity, characteristics somewhat similar to the EU’s foreign policy as the whole. 
As such, it is subject to the same conditions as the EU’s general activities in international arena. In order to evaluate 
it, then, one has to consider a set of conditions in which the entire European Union’s foreign policy operates.  
Another point that must not be overlooked is where the European Neighbourhood Policy originates from. It has 
been developed on the basis of tradition and expertise of international regional policies that have been run by the 
European Communities for several decades now, towards such regions as the Mediterranean or Central and Eastern 
Europe. In relation to the latter one, the ENP has been created basing upon an analysis of achievements of the so-
called Eastern policy, developed and applied by the Communities and its Member States for basically the whole 
post-war period.  
Witnessing the above, it seems well justified to place the ENP within the entire scope of operation of the EU’s 
foreign policy, which, in itself, has accounted for a genuine area of the EU’s activities. Then, it seems worthwhile 
to illustrate genetic relationships between the European Neighbourhood Policy and the EC/EU’s Eastern policy, 
since, considering their respective specific natures, it is not always possible to draw a clear dividing line between 
them.  
The essence of the EU’s foreign policy 
The notion of foreign policy has been applied, in principle, to describe actions of basic actors of international 
relations, namely – States. Foreign policy has been the principal tool to formulate objectives and assumptions, as 
well as to implement actions in the area of broadly understood relations of a State with the outside world. It is 
through their foreign policies (rightly regarded as one of fundamental attributes of sovereignty) that individual 
States build their positions and play their roles in international relations.  
Has the European Union got its own foreign policy? With respect to such a unique entity as the EU, the issue 
is, on the one hand, similar as in the case of a classic State. On the other hand, however, it is more complex. Having 
to regulate the area of their relations with the outside world, the European Communities developed from their very 
beginning quite a sophisticated institutional and legal system, under many respects similar to respective national 
systems. This is one of reasons why the EC/EU may be treated in a similar way as national actors of international 
relations and – consequently – to have their own Community foreign policy as well.  
However, the European Union is not a national structure. One of consequences thereof is that it has no single 
comprehensive centre to manage the entire area of relations with other actors of international relations. Another 
consequence is that scopes of competence of its institutions and bodies responsible for that area are limited. Exis-
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tence of national, sovereign centres of power in the field of foreign policy in the EU Member States accounts for 
another important factor in this respect, especially as we consider that such centres often tend to compete both with 
one another and with the EU bodies. This, in turn, encourages critics to deny the real existence of the EU’s foreign 
policy.  
Despite all this controversy it seems obvious – and is indeed further confirmed as one observes political prac-
tice – that the European Union nevertheless has got an area of its relations with the outside world firmly in place. 
This area, carefully organised in terms of its organisational, institutional and legal structure, if considered in a sin-
gle State, could traditionally be called foreign policy (Milczarek D., 2005).  
Regarding this category, a number of problems is experienced. In fact, any attempt at its thorough analysis – ei-
ther theoretically or empirically – brings forth many further serious issues. This difficulty stems from a striking am-
biguity of the matter, which is very peculiar, yet extremely vague at the same time. In practice this means that the 
area of the EU’s relations with the outside world has no precise border lines, either regarding its contents or its 
principal actors. In other words, it encompasses various issues and various structures. Moreover, no catalogue of 
clearly defined features or mechanisms of action can be specified for it. This vagueness becomes worse still as we 
consider a sheer chaos of possible interpretations regarding terminology, manifested in using most different names, 
such as “the EC/EU foreign policy”, “foreign policy of the EC/EU”, “European foreign policy” or “EC/EU external 
relations”.  
In spite of this sort of dimness, the area described as a sphere of the European Union’s relations with the out-
side world includes, in general, relations concerning two fundamental fields: one of economic nature and another of 
political and military nature.1 The former includes mainly (if not only) the Common Trade Policy, supplemented 
with development and human aid, whilst the latter relates to the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), sup-
plemented with the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP), constituting the so-called EU’s second pillar 
(Milczarek D., 2005b).  
Roots of this division are not uniform, either. Of course, it largely stems from traditional distinguishing into 
two levels of policy run by actors of international relations, namely, high politics and low politics, which has been 
quite traditional and well-rooted both in practice and in theory in that area. The upper level was understood as in-
cluding proper foreign policy applied by States, in most cases identified with using traditional diplomatic and mili-
tary instruments, while the lower one would rather include “down-to-earth” fields, such as foreign trade and eco-
nomic relations.  
An additional difficulty experienced in the case of the European Communities is whether it is right to attribute 
a power to run foreign policy in a narrow sense of the word to that organisation, considering that - according to 
many experts and practitioners - such a competence can only be enjoyed by States. The European Union, while in-
deed not being an independent international subject in a strict legal meaning, nevertheless has a unique status. 
Clearly, a national actor of international relations it is not, but it is equally obvious that it has both potential and at-
tributes to run its own foreign policy. This is best illustrated by the very fact of existence of the EU’s second pillar, 
even as flawed or inefficient as it is.  
Division into areas of external economic relations on the one hand and political and military relations on the 
other hand has also been determined by the fact that both areas differ in terms of their underlying philosophy: in 
economic matters it is mainly the Community-level bodies and institutions that enjoy competences, while in foreign 
and security policy it is Member States that have the final say.  
Despite this visible inner incongruity, both areas should be treated jointly, as one common and mostly, if not 
entirely, coherent sphere of the EU activity, which is quite different, after all, in its subject matter from other 
spheres, such as processes of internal economic integration. Yet, what is really important in that context, is to be 
aware that a so-defined European Union’s foreign policy really is a sort of a conglomerate. It includes elements of 
both policies applied upon the Community level and also of national foreign policies. This relates to both its princi-
pal components, since in both cases we have to deal with joint action of the Community level and centres of na-
tional authority. What remains different is only the volume of such action: the role of the Community bodies is 
much larger with respect to economic external relations, while the subject matter of the EU second pillar in princi-
ple remains the area of national policies.  
On the one hand, it is quite clear that the EU foreign policy failed to replace foreign policies run by individual 
Member States. Moreover, so far the EU has developed no institutional system that would really be common and 
consistent and could effectively represent that organisation and its Member States in relation with the rest of the 
world. Another indisputable fact is that, as far as the EU foreign policy is concerned, we are really witnessing a 
domination of Member States, which implement the CFSP mainly by means of intergovernmental collaboration.  
On the other hand, it doesn’t seem justified to entirely accept concepts in which an absolute domination of 
States is emphasised and according to which the European Union’s foreign policy is little more than a sum of its 
Member States’ national policies, at best coordinated at the EU level. Instead, it seems more apt to assume that the 
EU’s foreign policy plays a role of combining and securing common interests of its Member States within – as put 
in the Maastricht Treaty –“the ever closer Union”.  
Due to all these reasons, both the EC/EU Eastern policy and the European Neighbourhood Policy developed on 
                                               
1 Of course, it is also possible to extend the problem by adding other issues: social, cultural, ecologic and so on, 
however, such an interpretation would only further complicate the analysis of the problem. Besides, different as-
pects of these matters are in fact included in the two basic categories.  
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its basis, have been derivatives of the whole EU foreign policy, taking advantage of its strengths and suffering from 
all its weaknesses. It seems that the ENP could well be analysed using the “Capability-Expectations Gap” concept, 
formulated as early as over a dozen years ago by Christopher Hill (Hill Ch., 1993, 1998). The concept was based 
upon the statement that, while in fact the Communities from their very beginning attempted to act jointly in interna-
tional matters, it was not earlier than by establishing its Common Foreign and Security Policy in Maastricht that the 
European Union finally vastly increased expectations as regards development of collective and effective diplomacy. 
(Such expectations being expressed both by the EU itself and by its foreign partners.) Unfortunately, those expecta-
tions proved much larger than actual capabilities of institutions, instruments and means the EU could apply. Even 
more importantly, no resolute political will was revealed to make a proper use of all such instruments as were in 
place.  
This sort of diagnosis may also relate to assumptions and implementation of the European Neighbourhood Pol-
icy. It seems that expectations the European Union and its partners have expressed regarding the ENP effectiveness 
are quite serious; however, they not always seem to be fully aware of different limitations this policy has. One of its 
fundamental weaknesses is discussed later on; here it should suffice to remind the above-mentioned deficit in the 
form of a relatively weak consistence of the whole EU’s foreign policy, which directly affects the effectiveness of 
the European Neighbourhood Policy.  
It should be remembered that the ENP has been run at two different levels: that of the EU and that of it Mem-
ber States. This means that both intents and specific actions of the Community institutions are confronted with pref-
erences and national policies of the EU’s individual Member States. In many cases this leads to conflicts of inter-
ests or clashes, which, according to an extreme scenario, might result in the whole EU’s policy being paralysed. 
The lack of any consistent policy on the part of the EU regarding the conflict in the former Yugoslavia was a good 
example thereof, this having resulted, among other things, from disagreements between France and Germany. Dif-
fering attitudes of various Member States towards the “orange revolution” in Ukraine provide another example. The 
EC/EU’s Eastern policy, being a fundament for the ENP, obviously has to evolve in the setting of similar condi-
tions and limitations.  
Evolution of the EU’s Eastern policy 
Maintenance of proper relations with their Eastern neighbours has always been one of the key priorities for the 
European Communities’ foreign policy. In fact, the matter has been important on both levels: the Community and 
the Member States’ level alike, as evidenced by a large number of projects and initiatives, addressed – throughout 
the post-war period – first to the Communist block, including the Soviet Union and its Central- and Eastern-
European allies. As examples, the Communities’ involvement in the process of détente initiated by the activities of 
the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe or policies of individual Western European countries, in-
cluding, in particular, those of the leaders of the integration processes, namely France and Germany, can be men-
tioned. The former country has advocated development of all-European collaboration above block-wise divisions 
since the period of General de Gaulle rule (under the slogan of “Europe from the Atlantic to Ural”). West Germany, 
instead, developed their own, very intensive Ostpolitik. This is how the category of Eastern policy became a solid 
element of both the European Communities’ and their individual Member States’ foreign policies.  
The status of the Eastern Europe within this policy became even more important in effect of the “Autumn 
of Nations” at the turn of nineteen eighties and nineties. It was at that time that the European Communities had to 
face new challenges stemming from general transformations occurring in international relations. This mainly re-
garded a radical shift in the balance of power in Europe as a result of the fall of the Communist system in the East 
of the continent. The importance of the fact was enormous, not only for countries of the region, but for the whole 
Europe as well, as it opened up quite new opportunities of development of democracy and of nation’s right to self-
determination. Beneficial examples thereof can be found in victories of democracy in most post-communist coun-
tries and in reunification of Germany, however, we witnessed an appalling negative consequence as well – in the 
form of an outburst of a civil war in former Yugoslavia.  
In order to meet such new challenges, the Communities extended their legal and organisational formula by 
establishing, in 1992, the European Union to strengthen the area of European integration processes at an interna-
tional arena. But this was just one step. They also undertook efforts to define the model of their future relations with 
new democracies, arising on the ruins of the former communist system. Ties contracted with countries of the Vyse-
hrad Group (Poland, Hungary, Czech Republic and Slovakia) were relatively strongest and further consolidated by 
the fact that member countries of the Group actively promoted integration among each other under the Central 
European Free Trade Agreement (CEFTA), established in 1993.  
For Central European countries binding close ties with Western European integration structures of Western 
Europe – which has been, along the USA, the principal mainstay of democracy and of social and economic progress 
in modern world – provided an invaluable opportunity or even an indispensable condition of strengthening their 
economic and political status in Europe. Moreover, this enabled them to consolidate patterns of democratic State of 
law and of principles of liberal market economy, both of which were only at earliest stages of rebirth there.  
For the newly-established European Union, on the other hand, definition of a new formula of relations with the 
Central and Eastern Europe countries became one of the foreign policy’s priorities. By tying a closer collaboration 
with those countries the EU mainly aimed to achieve its strategic goal, namely that of ensuring peace and security 
in its direct neighbourhood and of minimising a potential risk of political, economic and social destabilisation in the 
region. The EU used a number of various instruments to shape its new Eastern policy, such as trade liberalisation, 
economic and financial collaboration or development of political relations.  
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At the same time, for Central European countries rapprochement with the Community structures became an 
important element of the process of preparation for their association with the EU and then of obtaining, by some of 
them, a status of the EU Member States. The Communities on their part, to meet such aspirations half-way, con-
cluded with Central and Eastern European countries association agreements known as the Europe Agreements. One 
important difference between them and any previous agreements was that they included political issues (under the 
so-called political dialogue), rather than concern economic matters only. The process of approximation of eco-
nomic, political and social life in the candidate countries to the Community standards, quite difficult and taking 
well over a decade, was concluded successfully: as many as eight of them became official Member States of the 
European Union in 2004 and two other ones joined them at the beginning of 2007.  
The EU Eastern enlargement also became an important turning point in development of the EC/EU Eastern 
policy. While previously the policy – even if focused upon the associated and candidate countries – in fact covered 
the whole Central and Eastern Europe region and all its countries, after 2004 it was clearly divided into two paths.  
On the one hand, it covered the so-called European Union’s Eastern dimension (following the pattern of its 
Northern or Mediterranean dimensions) and, in consequence, began to concern a specific group of the EU Member 
States, separated according to specific geographic, political, economic, social, cultural and other characteristics. On 
the other hand, the EU’s Eastern policy has still covered the remaining Eastern European countries, which at pre-
sent either would not or cannot aspire to become the EU Member States (which mainly relates to the Russian Fed-
eration, Ukraine and Belarus).  
These two paths, components of the EU’s Eastern policy, should be clearly distinguished, because at present 
they are quite different, both as regards their proponents and their contents. Interestingly, new EU Member States, 
while naturally being an object of the new policy (i.e. actions undertaken by other partners are addressed to them), 
at the same time are authors of that policy, as well, mainly in relation to their Eastern neighbours. This means that, 
following their accession to the European Union, ten Central and Eastern Europe countries ceased to be the princi-
pal object of the Eastern policy. Instead, they joined the remaining Member States as countries developing and im-
plementing that policy.  
In effect of its Eastern enlargement, the European Union faced new challenges, both in the area of further pro-
motion of its own integration processes and in that of absorbing previous achievements and potentials of new 
Member States in order to be able to take full advantage of benefits stemming therefrom (Milczarek D., 2006). The 
task, while very ambitious, is very difficult, too. In particular, it is necessary to carry on efforts aiming at prompt 
and complete inclusion of new Member States into structures of the EU integration. This was rendered much easier 
thanks to the EU’s policy in the pre-accession period – no matter whether it was called “Eastern policy”, “aid pol-
icy”, “pre-accession strategy” or any other. At present, in conditions of membership, such policy should advance 
with at least equal intensity or, ideally, with even greater dynamism. Considering the scale and importance of all 
sorts of the EU aid provided (mainly under the Structural Funds) to new Member States, its activities in this area 
should still be described as – specific as it may be, but undeniably true and valid – Eastern policy towards its own 
Member States. This takes place, at best, within what is called the EU’s Eastern dimension, i.e. in conditions of in-
tra-Community co-operation.  
The proper European Union’s Eastern policy, on the other hand, has mainly been run, at present, in relation to 
third countries. Following the initial stage of binding ties in the form of an association with most of the USSR’s 
former Central European allies and, subsequently, adopting them as Member States or not only the EU, but of 
NATO as well, the EU’s relations with the remainder of countries of the region became very differentiated. Con-
trary to any superficial generalisations, it is quite difficult to find any common denominator in this respect, espe-
cially as we not only consider Russia, Ukraine and Belarus, but also include other countries, such as Moldova, in 
the Caucasus region Georgia and Armenia, and in Central Asia – Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, etc. More-
over, positions and interests of the EU as the whole, and of its individual Member States in particular, are very dif-
ferent depending on particular cases. This is quite evident as one analyses factors that affect the final shape of the 
Eastern policy, one of which, notably, is an evolution of the power balance in the very core of the European Union.  
As mentioned above, certain Member States, especially France and West Germany, have always played more 
active role in developing and running the EC/EU’s Eastern policy. It should be emphasised that, in relation to an 
area of that policy which concerned relations with Russia (and previously with the USSR) their attitudes were 
largely similar or even identical – both were and in fact still are advocates of maintaining as warm and close ties 
with Russia as possible, in appreciation of the fact that while it used to be an ideological and military enemy at the 
Cold War era, it nevertheless has always been regarded as an important political and economic partner, as well. No 
wonder then that for quite a long time, relations with Russia dominated the European Union’s and its Member 
States’ Eastern policy. This changed only when the issue of accession the former communist countries from Central 
Europe as the EU’s new Member States became one of the priorities of that policy.  
Considering that matter one has to remember what often tends to be overlooked: that originally the European 
Union did not intend to invite countries of that region to become its Member States at all. That idea had to ripen for 
a long time before it found acceptance – the fact that explains all sorts of hesitations and inconsistencies in the EU’s 
attitude. In debates held to consider that subject attempts were made to decide upon the proper order of action: 
should the existing integration ties be consolidated first, or is it better to start with enlarging the EU area (the choice 
between deepening and widening). What finally prevailed was a pragmatic attitude combining both options, as it 
became evident that they were in fact dialectically correlated: the enlargement would make institutional reforms 
necessary anyway, since without them it would simply not be possible.  
Therefore, the concept of the enlargement Eastwards neither was nor is universally and unconditionally ap-
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proved in the EU. Beside various international and political factors, there are serious differences in individual 
Member States’ fundamental, strategic political and economic interests that play an important role in this respect.  
From that perspective, there may be two informal blocks distinguished in the EU: on the one hand, we have the 
“Eastern block” led by Germany, clearly advocating the enlargement in hope of shifting the EU’s “centre of bal-
ance” further East, in which they perceive an opportunity to strengthen their position (which has already been 
dominant anyway). On the other hand, the “Southern block” formed under leadership of France which is much less 
inclined towards the Eastern enlargement than Germany - unsurprisingly - due to the same reasons, but seen in an 
opposite way (as a scenario they sum up to is little interesting from French perspective). Beside, the Southern block 
countries naturally have their much more specific and important interests in the Mediterranean region.  
All these factors make the EU’s Eastern policy – both in relation to third countries and to its present Member 
States – rather inconsistent and vague. This mainly results from clashing interests of its principal actors – both in 
relations between the European Union as the whole and its individual Member States and in those among particular 
Member States, especially the most powerful ones. Historically this was manifested, for example, by emergence of 
individual French and German “Eastern policies” and, most recently, by the fact that both countries maintain spe-
cial relationships with Russia – traditionally the central object of interest of the Community Eastern policy.  
As mentioned above, the recent EU enlargement by the adoption of Central and Eastern European countries 
brought important modifications to that policy. This way, it was divided into two separate, if closely inter-related, 
currents, covering relations with some of the new Member States as well as with countries traditionally addressed in 
the Eastern policy, which now became partners under the ENP. It should be underlined that controversies in the EU 
regarding potential continuation of the enlargement process directly affect and will affect both the present and fu-
ture shape of the European Neighbourhood Policy which really becomes a hostage of a wider play of interests 
within the entire EU’s foreign policy.  
Quo vadis ENP? 
Of course, a set of the above-outlined conditions determining the process of developing and implementing the 
European Neighbourhood Policy fails to form a complete list of the most important issues. The present concise pa-
per cannot really reach beyond a number of key questions, such as an evaluation of how effective that policy occurs 
for the EU itself from the point of view of achievement of assumed tasks and objectives, or identification of condi-
tions that should be met in order to improve such effectiveness.  
There is no doubt the assumptions the ENP is based upon are very noble and, at the same time, politically and 
economically attractive. Its principal objective is to build a zone of political stability combined with balanced and 
sustainable economic and social development around the borders of the European Union. This is assumed to ensure 
the optimum conditions for smooth development upon an international arena to the EU and its partners alike. In or-
der for that policy to be implemented, a comprehensive range of measures were developed, not only economic, but 
political and social as well, to be used by the EU and its Member States under various types of aid schemes.  
However, final efficacy of all those efforts depends on more than just the quality of projects, preparation of ap-
propriate actions or amounts of resources involved. Instead, it seems that the principal problem behind the ENP is 
its very serious limitation, which results more from the very essence of that policy than it does from any weak-
nesses of its concept. The problem in question is the lack of the most important impulse to stimulate the EU’s part-
ners to contract close ties and collaboration under the European Neighbourhood Policy – namely: the lack of real 
prospects of getting their full membership in the European Union. This assumption was at the very base of the pol-
icy idea in the first place: out of definition, it isn’t meant to pave the way for membership, it is just going to build a 
network of close links with neighbouring countries or regions.  
Of course, one may rightly argue that the EU membership is neither necessary nor indispensable condition of 
development for any European country, including those situated at peripheries of the continent. Without any doubt, 
there have been many countries outside the European Union recording good or excellent economic and social re-
sults – and we are not only referring to wealthy ones such as Norway or Switzerland (neither included in the ENP), 
but to some Mediterranean countries, such as Israel, as well. Moreover, some ENP beneficiaries have been quite 
hesitant about binding too close ties with the European Union due to their various inner circumstances – this even 
holds true in relation to countries that officially wish to become the EU Member States, such as Turkey or Ukraine. 
Finally, it is obvious that neither a mere presence within the EU integration structures can be an automatic guaran-
tee of success, nor staying aside causes a country to necessarily lose its development opportunities.  
Nonetheless, as proven by both political and economic practice, prospects for becoming a European Union 
Member State acts as a very strong impulse that stimulates candidate countries to undertake serious efforts in the 
area of introducing reforms in the broadest scope and in most areas of economic, social and political life. Officially, 
such efforts aim at achieving harmonisation with the EU standards, but after all they bring an important contribu-
tion to general development of such countries, in particular as regards making up for their underdevelopment when 
compared to Western Europe.  
The case of Poland provides a good example of this. From the very beginning of the systemic transformation in 
this country, Polish authorities and society agreed it was necessary to achieve a strategic goal of Poland’s accession 
to the European Union. This enabled the country to undertake an enormous efforts to adapt all the areas of life to 
required standards, even despite the fact that the EU membership was not guaranteed at all. (One has to remember 
that the Europe Agreement Poland signed with the European Communities in 1991 stipulated for no automatic ac-
cession). In effect Poland, such as other candidate countries, managed to meet strict membership criteria and in 
2004 was actually adopted as the EU Member State, but – and this should be emphasised – the process of thorough 
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reform and modernisation of the country’s economy, legal system, political and administrative structures and so on 
would have been beneficial anyway (Nowak A.Z., 2002; 2006, 2007).  
Accordingly, prospects for achieving the EU membership may, on the one hand, act as an impulse stimulating 
systemic transformation, but – on the other hand – the lack of such a prospect can undermine processes of general 
development in countries-beneficiaries of the European Neighbourhood Policy. That, in turn, due to a resulting non-
compliance to requirements regarding political and economic stabilisation, might seriously weaken the effective-
ness of the policy. This is a real paradox, considering that the lack of prospect for the full EU membership has been 
the fundamental assumption of the ENP.  
This leaves us with a complex, but very important question: what next with the European Neighbourhood Pol-
icy? Of course, there is no single, easy answer to that question and since the objective of this paper is to indicate 
difficult problems, rather than offering simplified ways out, we are only going to list some general conditions that 
determine the future of the ENP. 
Most importantly, it seems necessary to define in a more transparent and resolute way general political and 
strategic perspective, not only for the ENP as such, but more broadly for the entire foreign policy of the European 
Union. There are evident signs suggesting that both political class and societies of the “old Fifteen” are weary with 
the recent round of enlargement and ill-disposed to consider any further inclusions to the EM membership. This, 
however, is not going to prevent the European Union from having to answer a couple of fundamental questions 
sooner or later, such as: what the EU is after all and what is it meant to become in the future? Is it just a group of 
countries tied with economic integration, with loose political links among each other? Or is it meant to bound to-
wards closer political union, basing upon the ever-stronger Economic and Monetary Union?  
The importance of such questions is further emphasised by such facts as the failure (by now, at least) of the 
Constitutional Treaty. While, naturally, failing to solve all those problems, at least this Treaty was a step in the right 
direction, towards better clarification of some of them. However, as it occurred, citizens of some EU Member 
States, having no “political compass” to show them the direction the European Union was bound, preferred do opt 
for a conservative solution and to avoid the risk of giving a new impulse to European integration. Admittedly, such 
a clear vision is certainly needed: an alternative idea of the European Union as wholly functionalistic organism, de-
veloping along purely pragmatic lines and only through solving subsequent problems, according to a “spill-over” 
effect, neither seems sufficient nor – more importantly – efficient enough.  
Just as important in the context of the ENP future are questions about where are the borders of united Europe, 
or Europe in general? What does it mean to be a European? Provisions of the EU Treaty stipulate for any European 
country a possibility to obtain the EU membership, but which criteria have to be met? Are Russia or specially Tur-
key (which has already been associated with the EU and has a status of a country-candidate for the membership) 
European countries? Which are the boundaries of Europe in geographic, political or cultural sense?  
Quite naturally, one has to be aware these questions are very sensitive politically or ideologically. (For exam-
ple, for some religious fundamentalists the identity of Europe stems, in the first rank or even exclusively, from the 
influence of Christianity.) In consequence, what we have to deal with here is neither any objective truth nor undeni-
able facts. Nevertheless, some attempts have to be made at the very least to answer such questions, because other-
wise we are going to face real and serious barriers, including in developing the European Neighbourhood Policy. 
After all, how can one resolve upon any specific action in relation to Turkey or Ukraine, unless criteria of what is 
“European” are set at first or political and cultural borders of the united Europe are marked? Should these countries 
be left for good in “European waiting room” within the ENP, or should a vision – perhaps difficult and ambitious, 
but ultimately viable – of gaining full EU membership be offered thereto?  
While, as mentioned above, we are not going to give any easy solutions regarding the future development of 
the European Neighbourhood Policy, some options may nonetheless be suggested. Above all, it seems necessary to 
render the principles that regulate that policy more flexible. In particular, a provision should be made allowing for 
offering to certain, selected ENP beneficiaries of the EU membership prospect. Another obvious necessity is that of 
intensifying the debate on the fundamental, strategic objectives of both the whole set of integration processes within 
the European Union and the EU foreign policy, since that debate should be able to resolve the dilemmas of the 
European Neighbourhood Policy, too.  
ENP and Ukraine - initial results 
Having thus commented rather critically about the loose and imprecise concept of the European Neighbour-
hood Policy – or, essentially, about its holistic nature – it seems fair now to emphasise some of its achievements in 
promoting democracy, market economy and political and economic stabilisation. This is true, among other coun-
tries, in relation to Ukraine, firmly supported in this respect by the European Union. As an evidence that the Euro-
pean Union treats its relations with Ukraine as one of its priorities we could mention the signing of a document enti-
tled the Common Strategy (1999) which, beside Ukraine, was only signed with Russia (Adamczyk A., 2006). 
Moreover, in February 2005 the Action Plan, signed at the end of the previous year, went into force, providing, on 
the one hand, for a sort of agenda of the EU’s co-operation with Ukraine and, on the other hand, a strategy for the 
European Neighbourhood Policy implementation.  
The Plan assumed, among other things:  
· The EU assistance in the process of economic and legal reforms in order to enable Ukraine to access the 
single market; 
· Participation of Ukraine in a number of the EU programmes in the areas of education, research or envi-
ronment protection;  
· Co-operation in the areas of border control management, migration, fighting of organised crime, of finan-
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cial and economic crime and of money laundering;  
· Improvement of cooperation in the areas of transport, energy and know-how; 
· Improvement of cooperation in fighting terrorism and counteracting proliferation of weapons of mass de-
struction as well as in solving regional conflicts. 
Provisions included in the Action Plan are very general. Whilst they enable either party to implement them, at 
least partially, with considerable ease, at the same time they are much less obliging. Simply put, this document as 
little more than a list of good intents. As eclectic as it is, its assessment can hardly be anything else than positive 
and in fact, it has mostly been evaluated favourably, especially by the EU experts, who rated the initial dozen 
months of its implementation rather positively. It has to be added, yet, that prospects for economic and political sta-
bilisation in Ukraine – which was, after all, the key objective of the European Neighbourhood Policy – cannot be 
assessed optimistically.  
In general, in any assessments of implementation of the European Neighbourhood Policy in relation to Ukraine 
it is indicated that, in effect of the entry into force of the Action Plan, a dialogue has been intensified between 
Ukraine and the European Union at all levels of authorities and on that of societies. This should make it easier to 
specify the EU’s expectations from Ukraine and the other way round, in perspective of potential Ukraine’s acces-
sion into the European Union.  
The EU report evaluating Ukraine in 2006 underlines, above anything else, political stabilisation achieved in 
the effect of democratic elections held in March that year. The report emphasises a considerable progress in the area 
of enactment of fundamental rights, protection of human right, protection of rights of prisoners and refugees, 
changes in regulations concerning freedom of speech, extension of rights of minorities, freedom of operation and 
independence of media, etc. Also, Ukrainian trade unions gain freedom of activity (this being a necessary condition 
for the country to access to the International Labour Organization). In short, at the beginning of 2007 Ukraine is 
relatively well advanced in building the rule of law.  
What also seems of note is an increase of a role Ukraine plays in an international arena, including, in particular, 
in its region. This especially relates to Ukraine’s relations with Moldova and Belarus. Ukraine becomes an impor-
tant link in the European security system in that area, participating, for example, in control of cross-border move-
ment of persons and goods, fighting the trafficking of people, drugs and arms. But this is not all - Ukraine also 
emerges as a valid element of the EU foreign policy, including in its broad context. It has been actively involved in 
a number of international peace-keeping missions, such as that in Bosnia-Herzegovina. In December 2005 Ukraine 
ratified the Ottawa Convention on the Prohibition of the Use Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-
Personnel Mines and Their Destruction. This then formed the basis for EU assistance to Ukraine for the elimination 
of landmines and old ammunition. 
In 2006 Ukraine may also boast a significant progress in stabilisation of its economy, althout it still remains 
highly vulnerable to external shocks. The considerable surplus in the current account (10.5% of the GDP in 2004), 
boosted by buoyant steel exports, turned into deficit in 2006 as import prices of energy increased, while the world 
market for steel tightened. With the negative term-of-trade shock, combined with sluggish investment demand in an 
uncertain policy environment, Ukraine experienced a hard landing in 2005. Its real GDP growth declined sharply to 
2.6%, against 12.1% in 2004. In 2006, however economic situation improved, with the growth of GDP at the range 
of 6.5%. The years 2006-2005 brought effective control of inflation that amounted to 8.7% in 2006 and 8.1% in 
2005, respectively. While the inflation rate is still relatively high compared to an average EU level, for Ukraine it 
has been quite an attainment to finally bring it down to a single-digit number. The National Bank of Ukraine, how-
ever, does not have a clear operational mandate to pursue price stability and provisions ensuring its independence 
still need to be strengthened. A broad understanding on moving towards inflation-targeting in the medium-term is 
emerging and a Memorandum of Understanding between NBU and Government, setting out respective roles and re-
sponsibilities, is under discussion.  
After pre-election fiscal loosening in 2004, fiscal conservatism has returned, keeping the general government 
deficit at no more than 3.5% of the GDP. This has been achieved through rapidly increases of tax revenues, which 
have risen from 29% in 2004 to 36% in 2006 (ENP Progress Report Ukraine, 2006). A monetary policy framework 
is based on maintaining a de facto pegged nominal exchange rate for the hryvnia against the US dollar.  
In general, an analysis of the above-quoted data regarding Ukraine’s macroeconomic situation in the years 
2005-2006 prompts one to admit that the country made a significant step towards stabilisation of its economy. 
Moreover, institutional transformations taking place in Ukraine, leading to gradual introduction of market economy, 
are noteworthy, as well. Most important in this respect is the establishment of a double-level banking system basing 
upon central bank along with commercial banks. Measures were also taken to create domestic capital market, the 
principal task of which would be to valuate financial assets on the one hand, while a stock exchange established in 
this context would be meant to become a source of capital needed for essential further investments in the country. 
So far, however, effects in this field are not impressive, as the level of capitalisation of the Ukrainian Capital Mar-
ket is less than 7.5%.  
While the above evaluation of Ukraine’s achievements over the recent couple of years is rather positive, unfor-
tunately not all of the country’s vital problems have been solved yet. In fact, it doesn’t take an expert to tell that, so 
far, the most serious problem is the lack of any clear and precise strategy for the country’s development. The task is 
all but easy, of course, as we consider that the country is in practice into two parts, one of which, Eastern Ukraine, 
explicitly proclaims itself against the integration with the European Union and in favour of closer collaboration 
with Russia. Another part, Western Ukraine, markedly and unconditionally declares itself for closer co-operation 
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and relative close integration with the European Union.  
Therefore, resolving upon a strategy for Ukraine’s development, while indispensable, certainly brings a num-
ber of objective problems with itself. Also, opponents of Ukraine’s accession into the European Union at any time 
soon – including those in the EU – take strong arguments from the ambiguous attitudes to that issue within that 
country. The lack of strategy is interpreted as the country’s immaturity to the processes of integration. Accordingly, 
suggestions are made to postpone any decisions regarding potential enlargement.  
Certainly, there have been many reasons for the lack of specified strategy for Ukraine’s approximation for in-
tegration with the European Union. Deficit of experience in running foreign policy, resulting from non-existence of 
independent State, undeniably was one of such reasons. However, there is no doubt that another important reason is 
a kind of disillusion with policies of the West, including the European Union, towards Ukraine, in particular in the 
period following “the orange revolution”. Such a disillusion seems to have stemmed from excessive expectations of 
Ukrainian society as regards economic policy – namely, vast foreign investments were expected in this respect – 
and as regards foreign policy, as well: what Ukraine expected in this case was to get the EU’s clear position con-
cerning regional problems and emigration policy, including the opening of the EU borders for citizens of that coun-
try.  
While all the above-mentioned expectations clearly had some justification, their fulfilment – as illustrated by 
experience of other countries, including Poland – was rather impracticable, due to many objective and subjective 
reasons, as usual. Objective reasons include problems occurring in the European Union itself, such as its relatively 
low rate of economic growth, delays in implementation of the Lisbon Strategy, high unemployment, relatively low 
competitiveness of the EU economy, problems with absorption of new Member States, with development of secu-
rity policy in the field of energy, both in Europe and globally as well as many other issues.  
If the interest the European Union manifests in the ENP concept prepared at an earlier time seems insufficient, 
this has also been caused by problems concerning consolidation of the EU’s identity, and in particular problems re-
lated to enactment of the European Constitution and development of common foreign policy towards such countries 
as Iraqi, Russia or Turkey. Subjective factors, in turn, seem to include above-mentioned holistic nature of the Euro-
pean Neighbourhood Policy.  
Therefore, in relation to Ukraine we have to deal with an especially delicate case, also due to Russia’s sensitiv-
ity to the European Union’s relations with countries of the former Soviet block. This is the more important in the 
present day, when two competing centres of power may be distinguished in Ukraine: the group of the Prime Minis-
ter Yanukovych, very resolute about the need to maintain a proper balance between Ukraine’s relations with Russia 
and with the European Union, as well as the group of the President Yushchenko, stressing the need for Ukraine to 
follow the path towards the West in a more determined way. This objective fact is quite comfortable for the Euro-
pean Union as it releases it from being obliged to specify precise perspectives and a rate of Kiev’s integration with 
the unifying Europe.  
This was particularly evident early in March 2007, during another round of Ukraine’s negotiation with Brussels 
regarding a new agreement concerning the country’s European aspirations. The EU Commissioner for External Re-
lations Benita Ferrero-Waldner took advantage of that opportunity to make a reservation that the agreement con-
cluded not only did not promise the EU membership to Ukraine, but also must not be mistaken for an agreement on 
the country’s association with the European Union (i.e. that it was nothing like Europe Agreements). No even spe-
cific name has been given to that agreement yet (calling in that agreement on association would be a 
misunderstanding – the EU diplomats say). At the same time, Brussels explicitly states that such “a deepened 
agreement” with Ukraine is going to be a part of the European Neighbourhood Policy. Commissioner Benita 
Ferrero-Waldner declared also that, assuming political will and readiness of both parties – Ukraine and the 
European Union – there is nothing to preclude any further steps to be taken in the future.  
In practice, what is much more important for Ukraine than such a general declaration, is the European Com-
mission’s decision on “substantial increase of financial support for the reforms process” in that country. In the years 
2007-2010 Ukraine will receive EUR 494 million. Since 1991 the EU “transferred” EUR 2 thousand millions to 
Ukraine, including EUR 212 million over two last years. Nevertheless, one has to remember that despite an increase 
of the level of funds for Ukraine, Mediterranean countries are still going to be more privileged than the EU’s East-
ern neighbours: between 2007-2010 eight Southern countries are going to receive a total of EUR 2,665 million, in-
cluding, for example, Egypt: 558 million, Algeria: 220 million, Tunisia: 300 million and Morocco: 654 million.  
Therefore, from the point of view of Ukraine’s political forces favouring integration with Europe, the imple-
mentation of the European Neighbourhood Policy is neither a simple nor easy task. It requires determination from 
both sides: on the part of the European Union and on that of the EU’s neighbours to which it is addressed.  
A special role in this respect should be played by Poland, as already manifested at the time of “the orange revo-
lution”. Warsaw still assists Kiev with its own experience in the process of transformation of post-communist econ-
omy. Unfortunately, so far, in spite of efforts in this field, Poland (supported by the United Kingdom, Sweden and 
Hungary), failed to win the case of specifying a precise European perspective for Ukraine. All in all, this is a clear 
sign that the role of the European Neighbourhood Policy, as potentially important element of a comprehensive 
strategy of the European Union’s foreign policy, should be much bigger than it has been so far.  
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PUBLIC SERVICE OBLIGATIONS IN THE ELECTRICITY AND GAS SECTOR AND THE 
ISSUE OF STATE AIDS 
 
В статье рассмотрена концепция Public service obligations (PSO) с позиции европейского законодатель-
ства. Особое внимание уделено вопросу классификации PSO в энергетической и газовой отраслях. Сделан 
акцент на формах финансирования, законодательных и регулятивных функциях PSO как общественного 
инструмента в вопросах защиты прав потребителей и свободы бизнеса.  
Ключевые слова: public service obligations, бесперебойность поставок, директивы в энергетическом и 
газовом отраслях, Европейский Суд. 
 
1. General remarks 
Public service obligations (PSO) are quite common issue in the utility sectors of many Member States, al-
though the concept itself and the importance of PSO to the national authorities and the industry vary significantly. 
In fact there is no European definition of public service obligations, what perhaps can justify differentiated ap-
proach to PSO among Member States.2 Secondary legislation, soft law and the case law of the ECJ is somehow un-
clear in this regard. It is used interchangeably the concepts of public service obligation, service of general economic 
interest and service of general interest. Therefore in reality it is difficult to come up with one clear definition of 
PSO’s which would apply to all sectors of the internal market. In general public services – most typically but not 
exclusively network services such as telecommunication, electricity, gas, transport and postal services – are ser-
vices of commercial character, which are considered essential to the general public. For this reason authorities3 im-
pose public services obligations upon certain undertakings to guarantee that such services are provided according to 
the conditions specified by the authorities. Moreover most PSOs are not justified in economic or business terms, 
since they are burden with losses. This means that under normal circumstances market would be very hesitant to 
provide them, or wouldn’t provide them at all. Therefore to ensure the availability of such services national/public 
authorities grant funding/compensation to the selected public service providers under certain conditions. This on the 
other hand raise the issue of compensation for PSOs vis-à-vis the EC State aid law, which aims to prevent distortion 
of competition by prohibiting State measures granting advantages to certain undertakings that have a negative effect 
on competition. Natural, thus, is to ask under what conditions EC State aid law is applicable to the State funding of 
                                               
2 Mangenot in his book Public Administrations and Services of General Economic interest: What kind of Europeanisation? also maintains that in 
the former centrally planed economies of some of the New Members, PSO’s are perceived as less important, than in the Old Members (with 
France being the greatest enthusiast and supporter). The existence of authoritarian regimes in the Central and Eastern Europe with domination of 
Soviet Union legal doctrine harmed the entire legal structure of the CEE states, where public service obligations were treated as an issue of ir-
relevant importance. It is only recently New States of the EU are recognizing the significance of the PSO for assuring benefits of the utility ser-
vices for the public good, thus inducing changes to their doctrines. 
3 The public authority entrusting the obligation can further be a national, regional or local. For more on this see Buendia Sierra, Jose Luis (1999). 
Exclusive rights and State Monopolies under EC Law – Article 86 (formerly Article 90) of the EC Treaty. Oxford University Press, p.284. 
